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Abstract 
This study investigates the carbon sequestration potential and co-benefits from 
policies aimed at retiring agricultural land in the Upper Mississippi River Basin, a large, 
heavily agricultural area. We extend the empirical measurement of co-benefits from the 
previous focus on environmental benefits to include economic transfers. These transfers 
have often been mentioned as a co-benefit, but little empirical work measuring the 
potential magnitude of these transfers has previously been undertaken. We compare and 
contrast five targeting schemes, each based on maximizing different physical 
environmental measures, including carbon sequestration, soil erosion, nitrogen runoff, 
nitrogen leaching, as well as the area enrolled in the program. In each case, the other 
environmental benefits and economic transfers are computed. We find that the 
geographic distribution of co-benefits (including economic transfers) varies significantly 
with the benefit targeted, implying that policy design related to targeting can have very 
important implications for both environmental conditions and income distributions in 
sub-regions. 
 
Keywords: carbon sequestration, co-benefits, co-effects, economic transfers, 
environmental benefits targeting, Upper Mississippi River Basin. 
 
  
 
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CO-BENEFITS OF  
CARBON SEQUESTRATION IN AGRICULTURAL SOILS: RETIRING 
AGRICULTURAL LAND IN THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI RIVER BASIN 
1. Introduction 
In the past decade, carbon sequestration in the agricultural and forest sectors has at-
tracted intense interest both in the scientific community and among policymakers. With 
the Kyoto Protocol becoming a binding treaty, many participating countries will be 
seeking efficient ways to meet the targets to which they have committed. Even countries 
that are not obligated by the agreement to reduce their greenhouse emissions (a notable 
example is the United States) are considering policies that will cut carbon emissions. 
Most of the literature on carbon sequestration has focused on its cost-effectiveness, and it 
has been shown that the agricultural and forest sectors have the potential to abate a 
significant amount of carbon emissions at moderate prices (McCarl and Schneider 2001). 
However, there are many critical issues that have to be addressed in designing an imple-
mentation plan for carbon sequestration, including the measuring and monitoring of 
carbon stored in soil, the non-permanence of sequestered carbon, and co-benefits (co-
costs) that are generated simultaneously with carbon sequestration. In this paper, we 
empirically examine the co-benefits issue related to carbon sequestration.   
Agricultural management practices that sequester carbon may simultaneously have 
other effects, often referred to as “co-effects” or more illustriously as “co-benefits.” The 
latter term is consistent with the view that the co-effects are likely to be beneficial for 
most agricultural carbon sequestration activities, although this will not always be the 
case. There are several reasons why a thorough understanding of the co-benefits associ-
ated with carbon sequestration is critical for designing policies to sequester carbon. First, 
the magnitude of co-benefits will determine whether program design needs to explicitly 
address co-benefits. For example, if carbon permit markets become highly developed 
wherein carbon sequestration credits can be purchased to offset carbon emissions, the co-
benefits are externalities associated with the transactions. Whether government interven-
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tion is needed to correct for the resulting inefficiencies depends upon the magnitude of 
the externalities; if the externalities are relatively small, then it may be socially optimal 
for policymakers not to intervene since there are always transaction costs associated with 
designing and implementing a policy. On the other hand, if co-benefits (or co-costs) are 
important, it may be necessary to regulate or adapt carbon markets to appropriately 
integrate the effects. In the extreme, if co-costs are very important, possibly even out-
weighing the significance of the carbon benefits, then it may make more sense to con-
sider fundamentally different policy instruments, (e.g., green payments in lieu of carbon 
markets).   
In addition to their magnitude, it is also important to understand the heterogeneity of 
co-benefits from different sequestering practices and the location of those benefits. For 
example, while both land retirement and conservation tillage are likely to improve water 
quality, land retirement has the additional benefit of reduced fertilizer and pesticide use 
while the latter does not. For locations with particularly poor water quality, this mix of 
co-benefits is likely to be quite important. For other locations, it will be less important.  
A third reason to consider co-benefits is that political support for a carbon sequestra-
tion policy may be strongly linked with co-benefits, particularly economic co-benefits. 
Farmers’ income is an important policy issue, especially in developed countries where 
income support for farmers has had a long history and where farm lobbies have strong 
power in promoting or blocking programs. In this context, it is imperative to know the 
size and geographical distribution of net transfers, not just gross payments, to farm-
ers/landowners to assess the likelihood of a carbon sequestration program’s acceptability. 
In general, areas that will potentially benefit the most from a program are likely to bring 
strong political support, which may or may not coincide with income distribution goals of 
federal policymakers.  
 
2. Co-benefits from Carbon Sequestration Policies 
Two distinct types of co-benefits have been attributed to carbon sequestration in ag-
ricultural soils: effects on other environmental goods and income support. For example, a 
program like the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), in which retired cropland could 
earn carbon credits in an expanded carbon market, would likely reduce erosion and 
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nutrient runoff, as well as sequester carbon. Since erosion and nutrient runoff are impli-
cated in water quality problems in many areas of the country, these reductions are co-
benefits of the program or carbon market.   
The co-benefits related to income support or economic vitality are a bit murkier to 
define and measure but are clearly dependent upon the details of the program or market 
that induces carbon sequestration. One way to define this co-benefit is the amount of 
revenue received by the farmer or landowner in excess of the full opportunity cost of a 
new practice or land use. Continuing with the land retirement example, if a farmer 
receives just enough compensation to cover his/her cost of taking land out of production, 
his/her net income will not be affected and therefore there will be no economic co-benefit 
from the program. However, if the compensation is greater than the opportunity cost of 
keeping the land in production, then the farmer has a higher net income and is better off 
because of the market/program. This is the measure of economic co-benefit we adopt for 
the remainder of this paper.  
In addition to these two categories of co-benefits, there are other categories of co-
effects of a carbon market or sequestration program that are not as direct but they may 
be sizable and are thus worth noting. First, if a practice affects the overall supply of 
agricultural outputs or demand for agricultural inputs, there will be effects on prices 
and this will affect society at large, resulting in overall welfare increases for some 
groups of people (e.g., consumers or producers) but decreases for others. These market 
effects are particularly important for assessing the impacts of climate mitigation strate-
gies at the national level. McCarl and Schneider (2001) provided an excellent analysis 
of such impacts for greenhouse gas mitigation in U.S. agriculture and forestry. Accord-
ing to their results, farmers could benefit overall from mitigation policies because of 
higher prices of their outputs, although consumers of agricultural commodities would 
lose substantially. Other examples of market effect analyses include Alig et al. 1997 
and Alig, Adams, and McCarl 1998.  
Another co-effect arises from the potential substitution of carbon sequestration for out-
right reductions in carbon emission. It is well known that carbon emissions often generate 
co-costs in the form of other air polluting compounds such as NOx. A large literature has 
been devoted to the estimation of the magnitudes of these co-costs, which can be sizable 
4 / Feng, Kurkalova, Kling, and Gassman  
 
(Burtraw et al. 2003). If carbon sequestration is used to reduce the amount of carbon in the 
atmosphere in lieu of directly reducing carbon emissions, then the reduced co-costs associ-
ated with the reduced carbon emissions will not be realized. The relative magnitudes of co-
costs from carbon emissions and co-benefits from carbon sequestration will affect overall 
social welfare, as discussed in Elbakidze and McCarl 2004.  
As noted earlier, few estimates of the economic co-benefits to farmers have been de-
veloped; however, there are some important studies that have assessed the size of envi-
ronmental co-benefits from sequestration activities. Plantinga and Wu (2003) estimated 
the reductions in agricultural externalities from an afforestation program encouraging the 
conversion of agricultural land to forest in Wisconsin. Using existing benefit estimates, 
they show that the value of reduced soil erosion and benefits from enhanced wildlife 
habitat are on the same order of magnitude as the costs of the carbon sequestration policy. 
Matthews, O’Connor, and Plantinga (2002) also found that carbon sequestration through 
afforestation has significant impacts on biodiversity and that impacts can differ by region. 
McCarl and Schneider (2001) demonstrated that reduced levels of erosion, phosphorous, 
and nitrogen pollution from traditional cropland are likely as carbon prices increase. 
Greenhalgh and Sauer (2003) and Pattanayak et al. (2002) both found that the water 
quality co-benefit of carbon sequestration is very significant. Finally, by reviewing the 
estimates in the literature, Elbakidze and McCarl (2004) concluded that the magnitude of 
co-benefits from sequestration is comparable to the magnitude of co-costs from carbon 
emissions.  
In the remainder of this paper, we assess the co-benefits from a carbon sequestration 
policy in a large agricultural region in the United States. In contrast with most previous 
studies of multiple benefits, this study not only estimates the relative efficiency of 
alternative benefit targeting schemes for improving various measures of environmental 
quality but also specifically investigates farmers’ profitability from participating in the 
policies. We estimate the overall magnitude of the farmers’ revenues and identify the 
spatial distribution of these revenues within our study region under alternative policy 
targeting schemes. 
In the next two sections we describe the basic model, policies evaluated, study re-
gion, and simulation models. Section 5 introduces the aggregate co-benefit results. 
Economic and Environmental Co-benefits of Carbon Sequestration in Agricultural Soils / 5 
 
Section 6 discusses the spatial distribution of the economic and environmental co-
benefits under alternative targeting of the policies, and section 7 gives the conclusions. 
 
3. Conceptual Model and Policy Design 
To model alternative subsidy policies, assume there are N crop producers (farms) in-
dexed by i that can potentially retire land from production, and there are K environmental 
improvements (benefits) such as carbon sequestered, reduced soil erosion, and reduced 
nitrogen runoff, indexed by j . Let ix  be the farm size in acres and ic  the per acre oppor-
tunity cost of retiring land. We assume that the retirement of acres from farm i generates 
j
ib  units of the j th benefit per acre, 1,...,i N= , 1,...,j K= .  
We consider a policy in which producers are offered a uniform payment based on per 
unit of the j th benefit, js , to retire land from active production. Although every farm 
enrolled in the program is paid the same payment per unit of the benefit, the payments 
differ across acres. The per acre profit the i th farm gets from participating in the program 
is j ji is b c− . We assume that as long as the farmer does not lose money from participat-
ing, he/she enrolls in the program on all the acres for which the subsidy is offered. In fact, 
such a policy pays some farmers more than the absolute minimum necessary to retire land 
from active production, thus creating a transfer of program funds to the farmers. 
Consider the policy that targets the j th benefit, that is, the policy that maximizes the 
amount of the j th benefit generated by the program subject to the budget constraint, C , by 
deciding on the magnitude of the payment js  as well as on the number of acres 
ix , 0 i ix x≤ ≤ , on which to offer the payment. Thus, the policymaker’s problem can be 
written as 
 
1,..., , 1
max
j
N
N
j
i i
x x s i
b x
=
∑  (1) 
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subject to 
1
0
N
j j
i i
i
C s b x
=
− =∑  (the budget constraint), 0i ix x− ≥ , 1,...,i N=  (land con-
straints), 0j ji i i is b x c x− ≥ , 1,...,i N=  (farmer rationality constraints), and 0ix ≥ ,  
1,...,i N= , 0js >  (non-negativity constraints).1 
If the farms are heterogeneous in the environmental benefits from land retirement 
and the benefits are not perfectly correlated across j , the solution to problem (1) differs 
depending on which of the benefits is targeted. In this study, we simulate the alternative 
subsidy policy designs in problem (1) under varying budget levels and under alternative 
choices of the environmental benefit. For completeness of the picture, we also consider 
the policy that targets the area retired, that is, the policy that maximizes the area enrolled 
in the program subject to the budget constraint. 
 
4. Study Region and the Simulation Models 
The study region is the Upper Mississippi River Basin (UMRB), which extends from 
the source of the Mississippi River at Lake Itasca in Minnesota to a point just north of 
Cairo, Illinois. The region covers nearly 492,000 km2, primarily in parts of Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, and Missouri (Figure 1). At present, cropland and pasture are 
the dominant land uses in the UMRB, which together are estimated to account for over 60 
percent of the total area (NAS 2000). Dramatic alteration in the native vegetation from 
perennial prairie grasses to extensive cropland has generated serious water quality 
problems; the region has more than 1,200 stream segments and lakes that appear on the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency listing of impaired waterways, and the area is 
estimated to contribute significantly to the nitrate load discharged into the Mississippi 
River, which has been implicated in the cause of the extensive Gulf of Mexico hypoxic 
zone (Goolsby et al. 1999). 
Because of the water quality problems, the area is a natural target for conservation 
efforts. Likewise, the highly productive agricultural lands, with their potential for carbon 
sequestration, make the region a good candidate for policies that target carbon. We 
consider a green payment type policy for carbon sequestration under which farmers with 
the highest benefit per dollar are enrolled. The payment is uniform across the study 
region and is equal to the highest cost per ton of carbon among enrolled farmers. This  
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FIGURE 1. Upper Mississippi River Basin: 4-digit HUC and percentage of area 
under cropland  
 
payment rate exactly equals the carbon price that would result from a competitive carbon 
market. Thus, while the study is motivated primarily with the design of conservation 
programs in mind, the findings, particularly with respect to income transfer, apply 
equally to a carbon market. We also consider programs that target other environmental 
benefits, treating carbon effectively as a co-benefit of these policies. 
The simulations are carried out on 40,249N =  National Resource Inventory (NRI) 
(Nusser and Goebel 1997) cropland points, each representing a farm, with the total area 
represented being nearly 26 million hectares (ha). The costs of adoption, ic , 1,...,i N= , 
are obtained using the approach of Smith (1995), who measured the opportunity cost of 
land retirement by means of the cropland cash rental rate. The methodology and empiri-
cal estimates of the cropland cash rental rates for the points considered in the analysis are 
provided in Kurkalova, Burkart, and Secchi 2004.  
We consider 4K =  environmental benefits from land retirement, including carbon se-
questration, reduction in erosion, nitrogen runoff reduction, and nitrogen leaching reduc-
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tion. The farm-specific environmental benefits, jib , are estimated at each of the data points 
using the Environmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model, version 3060 (Izaurralde 
et al. 2005),2 which has been extensively tested and validated for predicting the environ-
mental benefits from agricultural land retirement under a wide range of conditions. At each 
data point, two 30-year simulations were run, one assuming land retirement and the other 
assuming intensive tillage practices. Carbon sequestration is measured as the annual 
average of the difference between the total soil carbon under land retirement and that under 
intensive tillage at the end of the simulation period. The other benefits are measured as the 
difference in the average annual discharge under tillage and that under land retirement. The 
average carbon sequestration benefits of retiring land in the sample, 680 kg C ha-1 yr-1, 
compares favorably with those reported by Follett et al. (2001). 
 
5. Results: Aggregate Co-Benefit Estimates 
We investigate a maximum program budget of $500 million, which was estimated to be 
enough to enroll about 10 percent of the region’s cropland in the program. The total envi-
ronmental benefits of the policies are provided in Table 1. The first column presents the 
results from a policy that targets carbon, that is, enrolls acreage into the program based on the 
highest carbon benefits per cost of enrollment. Such a program is predicted to enroll 1.5 
million ha and to sequester 3.2 million metric tons (mt) of carbon and to have sizable erosion, 
nitrogen runoff, and nitrogen leaching benefits. The program would pay $158 million more 
to farmers than their opportunity cost, resulting from a per mt payment of just under $155. 
 
TABLE 1. Area, environmental benefits, income transfer, and the uniform subsidy of 
a $500 million land retirement policy under alternative targeting 
 Benefit Targeted 
 Carbon Erosion N Runoff Leaching Area 
Area (mha) 1.5 1.7 1.3 1.6 3.1 
Carbon (mmt) 3.2 0.8 0.6 1.0 1.3 
Erosion (mmt) 7.4 40.5 14.1 9.7 27.1  
N Runoff (tmt) 2.8 5.1 11.7 2.8 6.1 
N Leaching (tmt) 10.0 6.4 5.6 30.6 15.3 
Transfer (mill. $) 158.1 209.9 256.2 216.9 147.7 
Payment 154.8 12.3 42.6 16.4 163.3 
 ($/mt) ($/mt) ($/kg) ($/kg) ($/ha) 
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In contrast, the second column of the table indicates that if erosion gains are targeted, 
over 4 million acres would be enrolled. While only about one-fourth of the carbon would 
be sequestered as under the carbon-targeting program, more than five times as much 
erosion would be controlled. Sizable, but less dramatic differences in N runoff and 
leaching would also be realized. The total amount of transfer payments would increase by 
about one-third.  
The results for programs that would target N runoff, leaching, and land area are simi-
lar. In all cases it is evident that targeting significantly increases the amount of the 
targeted benefit obtainable relative to the policies that target other environmental benefits 
or maximize the amount of land enrolled. 
An intuitively appealing way to depict the consequences of alternative targeting 
schemes is through Lorenz curves (Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 2004; Zhao, Kurkalova, 
and Kling 2004). The Lorenz curves depict the proportion of the benefit obtained under a 
targeting scheme relative to the benefit obtainable when the indicator itself is targeted, for 
varying levels of budget. We simulate the policies at 25 varying budget levels and report 
the Lorenz curves in Figures 2 and 3.  
For example, when carbon is targeted (Figure 2), at a budget of $100 million, only 
about 10 percent of the maximum potential erosion or nitrogen runoff is achieved relative 
to if those benefits had been targeted. A higher percentage can be achieved as the budget 
increases (as expected), but even at the fairly high level of $500 million, only about 20 
percent of the maximum benefit can be achieved. While the percentages are higher for 
nitrogen leaching and the total land area, there is still a much smaller amount of the total 
benefits achieved relative to if those benefits had been targeted.  
Figure 3 depicts the situation for carbon when one of the other four environmental 
indicators is targeted. Again, the curves demonstrate that there is a significant trade-off 
between the carbon sequestered and environmental co-benefits and that that trade-off 
occurs even at fairly high budget levels.  
These results for the UMRB are similar to those reported in Kurkalova, Kling, and 
Zhao 2004 for alternate targeting strategies for the policies that offer payments for 
adopting conservation tillage in Iowa. Both studies find that targeting land in conserva-
tion policy provides the highest proportion of carbon benefits obtainable among the other  
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FIGURE 2. Area retired from production and benefits under the carbon-targeting 
policy as compared with those if land and/or the benefits were targeted 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Carbon sequestered under alternative targeting 
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targeting alternatives considered. However, the scale of the policies considered is differ-
ent in our study; while Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao (2004) investigate the budget levels 
sufficient to enroll almost the entire study area in the conservation program, we do not 
deem retiring large proportions of prime agricultural land realistic. In consequence, the 
Lorenz curves reported in Figures 2 and 3 do not achieve the much higher fraction of the 
maximum potential co-benefits reported in Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao.  
To obtain some sense of the magnitude of co-benefits provided in Table 1, we refer 
to the estimates available in the literature. Ribaudo (1989) estimated that the benefits 
from reduced soil erosion are about $5 per mt for our study region. For a policy that 
targets carbon, the benefits from erosion reduction alone would be about $35 million, 
which is about 7 percent of the program cost (or about 10 percent of the program cost 
minus transfer). However, for a policy that targets erosion, the benefits from erosion 
reduction would account for about 70 percent of program cost excluding transfer. In 
addition, if the carbon price turns out to be lower than $5 per mt, then the combined 
benefits from carbon and erosion would be higher under any policy considered than 
under the policy targeting carbon. It is difficult to estimate the benefits from nutrient 
reductions because it is a complex process to transform these nutrient reductions into 
water quality improvement. Even if we know the water quality improvement, its evalua-
tion can also be a daunting task. According to one estimate (Feather, Hellerstein, and 
Hansen 1999), the benefits of CRP from fresh-water based recreation can be higher than 
$10 per acre for our study region. Using this estimate, Table 1 implies that the carbon 
price would have to be higher than $10 per mt just for the carbon benefit to be as high as 
its recreational co-benefits. These rough estimates indicate that co-benefits from carbon 
sequestration can be significant. 
 
6. Results: Heterogeneity across Co-benefits and Geographical Areas 
We now consider the spatial distribution of these co-benefits, with a particular focus 
on the distribution of economic co-benefits. Since we consider five targeting criteria (the 
environmental indicators) and seven indicators for outcomes (program costs, transfers, 
acres enrolled, carbon sequestration, erosion, nitrogen runoff, and nitrogen leaching), the 
results are too numerous to illustrate in their entirety here. Thus, we select a few sets of 
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results, which highlight some of the most interesting spatial consequences of these 
policies. In Figure 4, we present maps indicating the share of land area, program cost, 
transfer payments, and carbon sequestration going to sub-watersheds in the UMRB as a 
result of a $500 million policy that targets the total amount of land area enrolled in the 
program. In Figure 5, the same set of information is presented for a program that targets 
carbon. We present the distribution of the per acre average values of some indicators 
when erosion is being targeted in Figure 6, and the distribution when runoff is being 
targeted in Figure 7.  
In contrast with Figures 4 and 5, Figures 6 and 7 present the distribution of the ratio 
of the region-average per acre indicator to that for the whole UMRB. To illustrate the 
difference, consider, for example, carbon indicators. Let { }*UMRB  and { }7080 *HUC  
denote the sets of the farms selected in the program that are located in the UMRB and in 
the sub-watershed (HUC 7080), respectively. Then, for the HUC 7080, Figure 4D and 
Figure 6D report 
{ }* 7080 * *
carbon carbon
i i i i
i I HUC i I
b x b x
∈ ∩ ∈
∑ ∑  
and  
{ }
{ }
* 7080 * *
* 7080 * *
carbon carbon
i i i i
i I HUC i I
i i i i
i I HUC i I
b x b x
c x c x
∈ ∩ ∈
∈ ∩ ∈
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ , 
 
respectively. That means that the magnitudes of the indicator depicted in Figure 4D are 
normalized so that the sum of the proportions of carbon across all the 14 sub-watersheds is 
equal to one. In contrast, the magnitudes of the indicator in Figure 6D are normalized so 
that the values above (below) one imply that the sub-watershed contributes higher (lower) 
amounts of carbon per acre enrolled than does the average acreage enrolled in the program. 
One immediate and striking observation from the maps is that the distribution of 
benefits is very uneven across geographical areas, regardless of which indicator and 
criterion is used. Thus, in addition to significant trade-offs between the total amounts of 
environmental co-benefits as seen from the Lorenz curves, there is also the potential for  
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FIGURE 4. Regional shares under area targeting 
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FIGURE 5. Regional shares under carbon targeting 
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FIGURE 6. Per acre of selected indicators under erosion targeting 
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FIGURE 7. Per acre of selected indicators under runoff targeting 
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sizable trade-offs across geographic regions. This point is especially important for transfers 
(economic co-benefits) because, unlike environmental benefits, monetary transfers generate 
direct and immediate benefits to farmers. Thus, there may be strong pressure from different 
sub-regions to adopt a policy design that will generate the largest net transfer for them. And, 
not surprisingly, different land will be enrolled under different criteria. In general, benefit 
targeting enrolls more land with higher costs than does area targeting, which, by definition, 
enrolls land with the lowest costs (as illustrated by Figures 4A and 5A). 
Despite the clear heterogeneity in indicators across the sub-watersheds, there is a 
surprisingly high degree of correlation between benefits (both environmental and eco-
nomic) and costs in the sense that areas with high cost shares also tend to have high 
benefit shares. This correlation clearly exists for the area targeting and carbon targeting 
criteria (as shown by a comparison between Figures 4B and 4D and between Figures 5B 
and 5D). It is also generally the case under runoff targeting and erosion targeting (maps 
not shown). However, there are some important exceptions to this generalization when 
costs and benefits are measured in terms of per acre values, as demonstrated by Figures 
6A-6D and Figures 7A-7D, where for example southwest Minnesota (HUC 7020) has a 
high carbon benefit per acre (Figure 6A) but a relatively low cost per acre (Figure 6D). 
A third observation from the maps is that under area targeting (Figure 4), areas with 
the highest transfer share include Minnesota and Wisconsin and the southern tip of the 
UMRB. This excludes Iowa, which has a high transfer share under all other benefit-
targeting criteria. It is also interesting to consider which areas have the highest potential 
transfer per acre. This question has different implications than the overall share accruing 
to a region because the former better measures benefits to individual enrolled farmers 
while the latter may indicate more about the overall transfer and economic vitality to a 
geographical region. Specifically, an individual farmer will have a higher incentive to 
participate the higher the per acre transfer, even though the overall benefit to a region 
may be low because only a few farmers participate. One way this can happen is if an area 
is on average a high cost area but has a few low-cost farmers. In this case, there will be a 
relatively low rate of participation, but those who participate may receive very high 
economic co-benefits (transfers).  
The areas with high economic co-benefits per acre appear to be the areas with high 
cost per acre (i.e., Iowa and Illinois) under the targeting criteria of erosion and carbon 
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(maps not shown). However, for other targeting criteria, this is not the case. For example, 
for central Iowa (HUC 7080), the cost per acre is high but transfer is low under area 
targeting policy. However, for the neighboring sub-regions (7100 and 7060), the opposite 
is true under the same policy. 
Finally, despite the heterogeneity across sub-regions just discussed, the maps for the 
three environmental indicators are largely similar, which is consistent with the Lorenz 
curves in Figures 2 and 3, indicating that there is a positive correlation among carbon and 
its co-benefits. Note that the maps show spatial heterogeneity under a single budget. 
From the parallel nature of the Lorenz curves in Figures 2 and 3, we may expect that the 
heterogeneity pattern would also stay about the same as the budget varies. However, this 
kind of extrapolation can be risky since our preliminary analysis shows that this is not 
necessarily the case.   
 
7. Conclusions 
As noted in the introduction, the efficient policy response to the presence of co-
benefits (both economic and environmental) resulting from land retirement to sequester 
carbon depends largely on the magnitude and distribution of the co-benefits across sub-
regions. The empirical findings presented here strongly suggest that for the region of the 
UMRB, the co-benefits are likely to be sizable in absolute magnitudes, with those magni-
tudes in turn being highly dependent upon the design of the policy (i.e., the choice of 
indicator to target). Further, the co-benefits are likely to be highly variable across the sub-
regions of the Basin.   
These findings have important policy implications. They suggest that if society val-
ues these co-benefits, then a carbon market or conservation policy that solely focuses on 
carbon sequestration will not be efficient.3 Simultaneous implementation of conservation 
policies and the expansion of carbon markets is one possible direction for such a socially 
efficient policy. However, this raises a number of challenging implementation questions, 
such as how to handle potential double payment for co-benefits (is a farmer who gets 
paid for land retirement from a federal program allowed to also sell the carbon credits in 
the carbon market?) and baseline questions (if a farmer would have put that land into 
CRP anyway, is it legitimate to count the carbon gains as additional carbon?). 
  
 
Endnotes 
1. For cases in which the solution to (1) is not unique, we chose the one that first enrolls 
the farms with the smallest cost per unit of benefit. This solution is also the one that 
provides the greatest total profit to participating farmers. Our simulation results are 
not particularly sensitive to this assumption. 
2. Earlier versions of EPIC were called Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator  
(Williams 1990). 
3. This of course assumes that the indicators we employ in this analysis correlate 
reasonably well with the true environmental services of interest. 
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